FOUR ROADS TO RICHMOND

by Joseph A. Angiolillo Jr.   with Richard Hamblen

THE RIVER OF WAR

by Richard Hamblen

In eastern Virginia, all campaigns led to the Rappahannock near Fredericksburg.

To understand why this was so, it is necessary to look at a map and talk a little bit about the unseen strategic realities in Virginia.

Starting south from Washington D.C. and the Federal base at Alexandria (as any Federal army would have to begin), the most promising route of invasion followed the line of the railroad to Richmond. In the contested region of northern Virginia this route followed the railroad through Centreville, Manassas Junction, Warrenton and Culpeper Court House before it ran past Cedar Mountain and into Orange Court House and the road south to the North Anna river and Richmond.

This route was attractive because it had the railroad available to support a supply line and because where it crossed the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers, at Warrenton and Cedar Mountain, those rivers were easily fordable. If necessary a flanking column could even be sent upriver to outflank any defense along the river line.

An invasion farther inland was unattractive because the terrain was rough and there were not enough roads to support a big supply line, especially in bad weather. The Bull Run Mountains formed a shield that ran beside the railroad from Centreville down to the upriver area. Beyond the Bull Run Mountains was the Shenandoah Valley, and the Shenandoah was a treacherous place dominated by easily-defended passes. An invasion down the Valley would be headed away from Richmond anyway, and it would be running the risk of being foxed away from defending Washington. The main Federal army never set foot in the Valley throughout the war.

On the other side of the railroad line there was another route of advance that should have been insignificant as well. This route was down near the Chesapeake Bay and the lower Potomac, where the rivers grew great enough to severely hinder maneuvering.

Just south of Alexandria, this route entered the box formed by the Occoquan, Potomac, and Rappahannock Rivers, an area that contained such important towns as Stafford Court House, Falmouth, and Aquia Landing on the Potomac. This area was deeply within the Federal sphere of control in Virginia—with major rivers hindering movement in every direction the area was just a trap for a Confederate army. The trap was worse for the Confederates because the rivers in their front were lesser obstacles than the river in their rear—the Occoquan was a much smaller river than the Rappahannock, to the west there was open ground aiding any attack from Warrenton, and the Federals could even strike from across the Potomac through their fleet. The tactical disadvantages of the position were so evident and so dangerous that the Confederates never tried to hold it with a sizable army and only dared to hold it at all when they were utterly certain of being able to retreat to Warrenton. As a result the Federals built a major depot at Aquia Landing and maintained it throughout the war, a secure supply line coming down the waters of the Potomac. (On the *Chancellorsville* mapboard the road leaving at WW37 would come to Aquia Landing in a few hexes.)

South of the Potomac there were areas more suited to a Confederate defense. The possible route of invasion divides nicely into two regions of terrain south of the Rappahannock. From Fredericksburg east the terrain was open but the Rappahannock was deep and could not be forded; west of Fredericksburg itself was the Wilderness, a tangle of woods and underbrush that reached nearly to Orange Court House. The Wilderness was the area of possibilities and danger, for here the Rappahannock could be crossed in many places, but there were few roads and a battle turned into a complex, unpredictable thing where the Union army's extra manpower did not count for much. If an invader could get past these areas he would come next to Spottsylvania Court House and a road south, but moving across the coastal lowlands he would find more wide, deep rivers blocking his way to Richmond.

Clearly the railroad line offered fewer obstacles to an advance. Yet in the end, although Federal armies were always willing to maneuver along the line of the railroad, when they finally moved south to fight they always came to the Fredericksburg area.

The reason why this had to be is hidden in the nature of the strategic balance in Virginia. The Federal army's size was balanced by the Confederate army's speed, and both of these factors tended to drive the Federals down towards the Fredericksburg route.

The size of the Federal army had three effects. First of all, the Army of the Potomac was an army that very definitely marched on its stomach and had to have a secure supply line. Throughout the war it was continually the largest accumulation of humanity on the continent, outside of the cities, and it often had present twice as many men as any other front line army, Confederate *or Union*. Manpower massed on that scale had special limitations on it: to keep all its human, horse, and cannon mouths fed it could not rely on the chancy business of foraging off the land (especially in war-ravaged Virginia), it had to have a secure supply line to keep it functional. Confederate eruptions onto that supply line could cripple the army's ability to fight for its advances and could end a campaign by themselves. Such a large army had to have a supply line.

The size of the Federal army created other problems as well. An army that size overloaded the road networks, forcing the army to march in small groups on many roads, and an army moving in many columns must march deliberately and with care if it is to keep its cohesion. The very size of the Federal army forced it to move slowly just so it could stay coordinated in front of the enemy.

Lastly, the size of the Army of the Potomac made it all the more valuable and irreplacable. To lose Washington D.C. would be a catastrophe, but to lose half of the Federal front-line soldiers in existence in one campaign would be an irreparable catastrophe, a consideration which weighed on the mind of every commander of the Army of the Potomac and increased their caution accordingly. It might be possible to abandon your supply line in a conquer-or-die maneuver with a smaller army out

west, but it would be madness to play conquer-or-die with Robert E. Lee when the stakes were the Army of the Potomac.

All of these consequences of the size of the Federal army—the need for a secure supply line, the slowness in maneuver, and the avoidance of risks—were magnified greatly by the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia's greatest strength, its ability to move and strike swiftly and far.

Under such circumstances a Federal advance along the line of the railroad was fraught with dangers. Confederate raids striking from behind the screen on the Bull Run Mountains could descend at will onto any supply line through Centreville (the raids were so unstoppable that the whole area became known as "Mosby's Confederacy" later in the war), and sometimes such raids would turn out to contain a whole Confederate Corps trying to bag the entire Union Army!

So in the end the Federals were never willing to chance a great battle with such a long overland supply line behind them. Raids would weaken their ability to win a battle, and in the event of a defeat or even a stalemate they would face the threat of a Confederate super-raid cutting off the retreat of the whole army.

Down near Fredericksburg things were not so risky. The wide Potomac with its friendly Federal fleet was near, and a short and perfectly safe supply line could run to Aquia Landing and then out to sea. The threat of Confederate maneuvers was cut down by the difficult terrain, and if the Federal attacks also became that much harder it was a cheap price to pay for the twin luxuries of steady supplies and a safe retreat after a defeat.

So, at last, one after another the Federal commanders of the Army of the Potomac came to the same conclusions and came down to Fredericksburg to fight. And Robert E. Lee was always there to meet them.

. . . Which, in the end, might have been a mistake. Lee could make the Federals lengthen their supply line again merely by retreating to the good defensive positions behind the North Anna river, and once again the Federal commanders would have to face the threat of a raid coming down behind them. For Lee it was in miniature the question that plagued the Confederacy as a whole—whether to sacrifice ground in the interests of a possibly devastating counterattack.

**The Federal Generals who came
to the River of War:**

McClellan, in March 1862. He turned away and came at Richmond by water.

McDowell, from April to June, 1862. He did not march south.

Pope, in July and August 1862. He tried to operate along the line of the railroad, and had the error of his ways shown to him.

McClellan, in October 1862. He tried to operate along the railroad and cautiously guard his line of communications, which made him so cautious that he would not fight. He was replaced.

Burnside, in November and December 1862, came and fought at Fredericksburg.

Hooker spent the winter there and in April 1863 came to fight at Chancellorsville.

Meade, in August 1863, operated along the line of the railroad following Gettysburg. There was much wary maneuvering, too wary to bring on a great battle.

Grant, in April 1864, came south to fight at the Wilderness on the longest road of all; the road to Richmond.

It was a close decision, and in fact Lee did offer to let the Federals across the Rappahannock a few times, but the Federals were always too wary to fall into any trap. Lee only offered the opportunity when he had forces perfectly positioned to raid into the difficult river country.

And as the war went on, and Lee's force and his ability to counterattack dwindled, he became more and more willing to be satisfied to defend with the advantages of the Rappahannock and the Wilderness, accepting the morale advantages of stopping every Federal attack at the Rappahannock, and making the Federals fight for every inch of territory rather than gamble on a chancy raid in the river country.

So in the very end the road to Richmond led past Fredericksburg, by mutual consent. In men, money, and powder spent there it was, and is, the most valuable section of real estate in America.

PROLOGUE TO FREDERICKSBURG

In the first place the problem was political.

Due to the political nature of the Civil War the northern politicians were deeply committed to victory, distrustful of the military establishment, and very aware of their own power in a volunteer war effort run on popular support. All of these factors led the politicians to intervene in the military's conduct of the war.

The politicans were untutored in military science, however, and they were unwilling to blindly trust their expert advice (they distrusted the peacetime officer corps because of the southern sympathy known to exist there). As a result the politicians were forced to think in the simplest and most obvious terms: advance or inaction, obedience or disobedience, victory, or defeat. The politicians were going to take an active part in the war, and the generals were going to have to deliver in a most obvious fashion; this was the political pressure that lay on them always.

The political factors, and the political pressure, were all enormously magnified in the fall of 1862. The Emancipation Proclamation, revered and controversial at that time, had sent the political stakes through the roof. At the same time the politicians were at the end of a year of trying to get the most prestigious soldier in the North, George B. McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac, to advance and fight. Time after time McClellan had defied them, and their wrath grew as they mobilized their pressure.

Finally, on November 5, 1862, McClellan, "Young Napoleon," the most beloved commander the Army of the Potomac ever had (and the best, according to Robert E. Lee), was removed from command for refusing, one last time, to advance and fight.

The master was gone, replaced by a longtime subordinate, Ambrose E. Burnside.

Everybody was very sensitive to what the political pressure was saying: Advance! And fight!

(Note of some interest: On November 6, before he received word of his dismissal, McClellan routinely ordered that all the military stores at Harpers Ferry be sent to Washington. Among those stores was the pontoon train of the army. Keep an eye on those pontoons . . .)

THE CAMPAIGN OF FREDERICKSBURG

In the campaign of Fredericksburg the Army of the Potomac started by moving too fast, failed because it moved too slowly, and finished by not being able to move at all.

The new commander, Ambrose E. Burnside, submitted a plan of advance for approval before he even formally assumed command of the army.

On November 14, 1862 Lincoln approved the plan.

The next morning the Federal Army was marching.

It might be wise here to look at the opposing armies at that instant.

The Army of the Potomac was spread along the line of the railroad to Culpeper. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was divided into two equal sections, half under Longstreet guarding Culpeper and the other half under Jackson far away in the Shenandoah Valley, threatening to erupt through the passes onto the railroad supply line.

The Federal army was positioned primarily for defense. Four army corps were near Warrenton, half-heartedly threatening Lee and Longstreet across the barrier of the upper Rappahannock, but three more were back watching Jackson and holding the passes at Harpers Ferry and above Centreville. A final corps—the III—was just rejoining the army after a prolonged convalescent stay in the defenses of Washington.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of many elements with differing histories, and combining its old strength with new arrivals it was going into this campaign with its power at a wartime high. The heart of the army was the troops that McClellan had organized and that had gone with him to the Peninsular Campaign: the II, III, V, and VI corps (the IV corps had been wrecked and discontinued on the Peninsula, its troops going to fill out the VI corps). Added to them was the I corps, only one division of which had made it to the Peninsula. There were also two runty corps formed out of the troops that had been left to garrison the Shenandoah and West Virginia, the XI and XII corps. Finally there was the alien IX corps that had made its reputation—and Burnside's—in a campaign down in the North Carolina sounds.

The army's command was a mixture of old and new as well. To ease his administrative duties Burnside had organized these eight corps into four miniature armies called "Grand Divisions," each miniature army containing two corps with artillery and cavalry support. The artillery reserve was still kept separate. To staff the eight corps and four grand divisions Burnside had three corps commanders, four division commanders, and four brigade commanders from the Peninsula-era army (Sigel commanded both the Reserve Grand Division and the XI Corps); for six of them Fredericksburg was their first campaign in corps command.

The Army of Northern Virginia was more conventionally organized, but it had been somewhat reorganized as well. Jackson's Corps was unchanged with the two Valley divisions and the oversized divisions of the Hills, but the brigades of Longstreet's Corps had been shifted to form more balanced divisions with incompetent commanders weeded out. The artillery of the whole army had been overhauled, with the understrength or inefficient batteries merged into the others, although the batteries had not yet been organized into battalions, a reform that was to come after Fredericksburg. For commanders of his two corps and nine divisions Lee had two corps commanders and four divisions commanders who had held their positions since the Peninsular campaign—and of the new men, three were Early, Hood, and Pickett!

Lee's command was much better led than the Federals', and in the tactical pause since Antietam many stragglers, recovered wounded, and new recruits had joined the army. The Army of Northern Virginia was going into the campaign of Fredericksburg with its effective strength at a wartime high.

On November 14, Lincoln's approval still warm in his pocket, Burnside sent out his orders. The Grand Divisions were set up. A message was sent up to Washington asking that a pontoon train be sent to Fredericksburg at once. Sumner's "Right Grand Division" was ordered to Fredericksburg to meet the pontoons and cross.

. . . Mistake. The campaign was starting too fast. With no one paying special attention amidst the general shifting of stores, the order to send the pontoons from Harpers Ferry had not been received until the 12th. The pontoons were just arriving in Washington on the 14th. The message came back that it would take a few days to get a pontoon train together.

Burnside didn't listen. Franklin's Grand Division marched on the 16th, the VI Corps coming from Jackson's front and the I Corps from Lee's. The artillery reserve followed the next day, with Hooker's Grand Division bringing up the rear. The whole army was moving for Fredericksburg.

In Washington the pontoon train was casually assembled. Casually? No one had thought to tell the commander of the train why they were needed. Going through channels fighting red tape, he gradually requisitioned the horses and wagons he needed.

In military science there is an axiom about "converging columns"; the rule is, don't depend on two independent columns arriving at the same place at the same time.

For Burnside, one column was his army. The independent column was the pontoon train.

The entire cutting edge of the Army of the Potomac, three Grand Divisions and the artillery reserve, were in position opposite Fredericksburg by November 19. That day the pontoon train *started* from Washington, its commander worrying about manhandling the clumsy things down the rough roads.

Lee had not been idle. Deducing accurately from the Federal corps marching across his front, he had started two divisions and a cavalry brigade for Fredericksburg on the 18th, and on the 19th he sent the rest of Longstreet as well. Lee knew he had been flanked—there were only two batteries and two regiments to oppose a Federal crossing at Fredericksburg—and he expected he'd be forced back to defend on the next river to the south, the North Anna. Confederate engineers were already preparing a position there.

In the Federal camp dissention reigned. Cross! said the subordinate generals. Send Sumner across in boats. Hooker wanted to cross by the fords above the city.

Burnside waited for the pontoons. He thought the fords would not remain useable under the crossing of a large body of troops or a supply train. The army waited.

On the 21st of November the last of Lee's army had arrived and was entrenching behind Fredericksburg. Lee, sure at last that he'd found the whole Federal army, sent a message to Jackson in the Valley: come in towards Fredericksburg, but take your time. It was raining and Lee was worried about the roads, but he thought Jackson could still threaten the Federal flank from Culpeper.

On the 21st the pontoon train, halfway down from Washington and struggling in the mud, had to use its pontoons to cross the swollen Occoquan River.

Marching leisurely, Jackson came into Orange Court House on November 26. The roads were so bad that it was pointless to advance him to Culpeper. On the 27th Lee ordered him into Fredericksburg.

Having finally abandoned the impassable roads, the pontoon train at last floated down to the Army of the Potomac.

After arresting the officer in charge of the pontoon train, Burnside immediately started searching for a place to cross. Fredericksburg was unappealing with Longstreet's corps waiting there on the hills, so Burnside started looking downstream where the Rappahannock was wider and there were only a few places where it was possible to throw a bridge.

Two possible places were found: fifteen miles below, at Skinner's Neck, and five miles below that at Port Royal. Engineers were sent, and Burnside himself went down to look the places over.

On November 30 Jackson's Corps arrived at Fredericksburg. Burnside was feverishly getting ready to cross at Skinner's Neck.

On December 3, Jackson's corps marched downstream and occupied the positions that seemed so interesting to all those Federal engineers.

Burnside was blocked. The campaign had finally lasted too long. It was a failure.

It was too late in the rainy season to try a campaign of maneuver and besides the railroad supply line had been dismantled and it would be an enormous job to set it up again. Burnside could move to another line and try again. But in front of him was the whole army of Northern Virginia, entrenched in an awesome position.

By all military rules Burnside should have just closed the campaign and gone into winter quarters. He could not maneuver and how could he fight?

BUT . . . from above there came the pressure. Advance and fight! We have had enough waiting!

Burnside remembered McClellan's decapitated career. And Burnside was nowhere near the powerful figure that McClellan had been. Burnside always believed in following orders, he'd even submitted his plans for approval and hadn't budged until they were approved . . .

ADVANCE AND FIGHT!

On December 11, 1862, the Army of the Potomac was crossed into Fredericksburg, where two days later it assailed the Confederates on the heights.

About that Confederate General Joe Johnson had the final word, when he heard about the battle from afar: "what luck some people have. Nobody will ever attack you or I in such a place."

Two days later, under cover of darkness and storm, the Federal army stole back across the river.

The campaign of Fredericksburg was not yet over, however. Despite the catastrophic reaction to the battle (Kentucky almost seceded), the political pressure continued from above. Nine of the eighteen divisions that had crossed the river were almost unscathed, and in addition both the army and the garrison at Washington had additional troops that had not even been near the battle.

The Reserve Grand Division had been left behind to guard Harpers Ferry and the approaches to Washington. It had started to move south at the same time that the main army began crossing the Rappahannock, and the XI joined the main army just after the battle. The XII Corps was left around Centreville, but it was just a few days' march away and Burnside could call it in whenever he wanted it. In addition a convoy of unassigned regiments was released from the defenses of Washington and marched down to Burnside along the Maryland bank of the Potomac. They crossed to Aquia Landing the day of the battle.

So, numerically, the Army of the Potomac was in acceptable condition. Morally, however, it had been crippled. The junior officers were aghast at the stupidity and carnage of the battle, and had had the additional shock of seeing Burnside practically fall to pieces after the first day's catastrophe. Now, with the season growing even later Burnside was still talking about advancing.

Worried delegations of officers began to slip into Washington to have some confidential discussion with the War Department.

Lee, meanwhile, was perfectly willing to wait it out on this line if it took all winter. Hampton's cavalry brigade was stationed up by Kelly's Ford, and regularly it darted up and razed the miniature supply road that came down the Virginia bank of the Potomac. That's where he'd been while the battle of Fredericksburg had been going on, and after the battle he continued the raids, culminating in a massive expedition of all the brigades led by Stuart himself on December 27.

Burnside was about to start another movement when a warning message from Lincoln stopped him.

Finally, on January 20 Burnside was moving again. It was clear that he would never be able to win through at Fredericksburg, so at last he was listening to Hooker's advice. This move would be

via the fords upstream. The whole army was set into motion, the XII Corps was ordered to march down to the main body.

Lee saw this move and started his columns to intercept.

. . . And on the 20th of January it rained. On the 21st it rained. The pontoons, moving to the fords, became hopelessly bogged down. The artillery became immobile in the mud. It rained. The infantry itself finally slowed, unable to move.

This was the famous "Mud March," and it finished Burnside. The army finally turned around and squished its way back to its winter camps on the 23rd.

In the last place the problem was military. Burnside had claimed he was inadequate to lead an army, and he had set up the Grand Divisions to take over the administrative work load. They failed him. Supply became irregular, sanitation became a problem. Morale plummeted, aided by the catastrophe at Fredericksburg and the exhausting debacle of the march in the mud.

The army rotted beneath Burnside's feet.
The Army of the Potomac was unable to be used as an army. It could not move.
The campaign was ended.

On January 25th Burnside was removed, and the army went into winter quarters, healing itself and waiting for the spring.

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG

December 13, 1862 was a cool, crisp morning in the hills surrounding Fredericksburg, Virginia. Fog blanketed the Rappahannock River, cloaking the charred buildings of yesterday's skirmish. About 10 o'clock the rays of the sun struggled through the fog to reveal an unbelievable spectacle. To the right of the city, in the plains below, 50,000 Federal soldiers of Franklin's Grand Division awaited the order to attack. Rank upon rank of marching soldiers, their standards flying and couriers galloping between regiments, offered a blue contrast to the white light of flashing bayonets against the rising mist. The panorama must have resembled a blue blanket covering new fallen snow.

In the city itself Federal troops of Sumner's Grand Division were busy massing in the streets. Although their positions were obscured by burned buildings, the rumble of artillery in motion informed the Confederates that something was amiss.

Beyond the Rappahannock, Stafford Heights rose above the riverbank, commanding the plains on the Confederate side of the river. Iron barrels of the Union artillery reserve speckled the ridge from the dam above Fredericksburg to a mill on the right. The largest dots, obviously the Federal siege guns, occupied the center of the ridge. Two divisions of infantry guarded the pontoon bridges to the south at Franklin's crossing.

In front of the Union position, between the Confederate and Union lines, the plains were broken by small ravines and streams. Hazel Run and Deep Run were definite obstacles, flowing through ravines hidden by woods and thick undergrowth. Although fordable in depth, the creeks were "psychologically" unfordable. In warm weather most soldiers would accept a thorough drenching, but in the dead of winter water would freeze to a soldier's skin, producing cold, pneumonia, and death. The Confederates knew this only too well and they burned bridges over Deep Run, Hazel Run, and the drainage ditch behind the city. The Canal, unlike the creeks, was actually unfordable. This was a blessing to the defenders who only needed to defend the bridges.

The Confederates defended on wooded, sloping hills and wooded ridges; in breastworks, redoubts, and rifle pits. By far, Marye's Heights was the strongest position on the field. Other prominent features included Stansbury Hill, Telegraph Hill, Cemetary Hill, and Prospect Hill, all of which rose 40 to 50 feet above the surrounding plains. To the right of the Confederate position was marshy land, frozen solid by the cold temperature.

To take these positions Burnside had the best six corps of the Army of the Potomac (the other two corps, the XI and XII were in the rear guarding the approaches to Washington). Burnside considered himself a sort of Army Group Commander; he would stay on the other side of the river and send only the most general directions to the generals commanding at the front. The battle would develop depending on how these commanders interpreted those orders.

In Fredericksburg itself, on the Federal right, the commander was Edwin Sumner, whose most obvious qualities were his straightforward aggressiveness and his loyalty. On the left the Federal commander was W. B. Franklin, a general from the McClellan clique and a conservative attacker, in the McClellan mold. The junior among the Grand Division commanders was "Fighting Joe" Hooker on the other side of the river, but his responsibility was limited to sending up the reserves as they were needed. The battle would develop as Sumner and Franklin saw fit.

On December 12, Burnside sent up his orders to Sumner and Franklin: on the right and on the left the Grand Divisions were to advance and occupy the commanding terrain behind Fredericksburg. No specific directions were given; no mention was made of the Confederates who happened to be occupying those heights.

From this evolved the battle of Fredericksburg.

Franklin moved first, sweeping down the river and up to the Confederate positions. Meade's crack division of Pennsylvania Reserves led the advance, two brigades abreast and one in reserve. On his right came Gibbon; on his left, along the riverbank, marched Doubleday. In his front there were ravines and the Richmond road and advanced Confederate batteries, harrying the steady advance.

"The Gallant Pelham," the daring commander of the Confederate horse artillery, led the first Confederate reaction when he galloped out with two guns and held off the whole advance for half an hour by threatening to rake the advancing Federal flank. Overwhelming masses of artillery were brought up and he was driven away, but he had gained half an hour and a great name.

Finally the Federal advance had reached its full extension. The VI Corps was back guarding the bridges; reinforcements were starting across the river to bolster the advance. In front of the Federals massed Confederate batteries concentrated their fire from both flanks, protected by A.P. Hill's massive Confederate division deployed along the line of the railroad embankment.

FREDERICKSBURG UNIT IDENTIFICATION for all accompanying maps.

1: Pickett; 2: Wilcox's brigade; 3: Wright's brigade; 4: Mahone's brigade; 5: Perry's brigade; 6: Featherston's brigade; 7: Cobb's brigade; 8: Ransom's brigade; 9: Cooke's brigade; 10: Semmes' brigade; 11: Kershaw's brigade; 12: Barksdale's brigade; 13: Stuart; 14: Cabell's artillery; 15: I Corps artillery; 16: Pendleton's artillery; 17: Robertson's brigade; 18: Anderson's brigade; 19: Toombs' brigade; 20: Law's brigade; 21: Thomas' brigade; 22: Pender's brigade; 23: Lane's brigade; 24: Gregg's brigade; 25: Archer's brigade; 26: Brockenbrough's brigade; 27: Pendleton's brigade; 28: Paxton's brigade; 29: Warren's brigade; 30: Jones' brigade; 31: Walker's artillery; 32: Pelham's artillery; 33: Brockenbrough's artillery; 34: Lawton's brigade; 35: Hays' brigade; 36: Hoke's brigade; 37: Walker's brigade; 38: D H Hill;

a: Meade; b: Gibbon; c: Doubleday; d: Howe; e: Brooks; f: Newton; g: Sickles; h: Birney; i: Burns; j: Getty; k: Sturgis; l: French; m: Hancock; n: Howard; o: Griffin; p: Humphreys; q: Whipple; r: Sykes; s: Pleasonton; t: Averill; u: Bayard's brigade; v: Right Division of artillery; w: Right Center Division of artillery; x: Left Center Division of artillery; y: Left Division of artillery; A: Right Grand Divisional artillery; B: III Corps artillery; C: V Corps artillery; D: Left Grand Divisional artillery

Slowly but surely, as the morning passed, the Federal batteries silenced the Confederate artillery. Finally they were quiet, just as Birney's division of reinforcements came up to support Meade.

At that moment Meade led his Pennsylvania Reserves towards the Confederate line. It was 11:30 a.m.

Unbelievable as it may seem, there was a gap in the Confederate line between Lane's and Archer's Confederate brigades. The marshy ground was rugged and densely wooded. In the summer it would be practically impenetrable, but the cold weather had changed all that. Apparently A.P. Hill did not realize his predicament nor did Gregg whose brigade was positioned in reserve behind the frozen marsh. The result was predictable but totally unexpected.

Meade swept away Lane and Archer and sent Gregg's brigade spinning, its leader mortally wounded.

All of this Meade had done alone. As his division paused and wondered where its reinforcements were, the Confederates started to react. Jubal Early's division and the Stonewall division started forward, as Gibbon hurried forward and tried to catch up with Meade's attack.

In Fredericksburg itself, meanwhile, the Federals had spent the morning bringing up troops and getting them into position. Then, at noon, the sound of firing wafted up the river from Meade's fight. The battle was beginning. The orders came down from Sumner: go in.

The II Corps stepped out and headed towards the only part of the Confederate line they could get to—a little stone wall at the base of Marye's Heights, the hill behind Fredericksburg.

The Confederates had been fortifying this area for a month, and they were ready. The stone wall itself hid Cobb's brigade, and Ransom's entire division was farther up the hill and hidden behind the protected rear slope, as reserves. Along the crest Longstreet had concentrated the artillery from two divisions plus both reserve battalions from his reserve artillery. The famed "Washington Artillery" was directly behind and above the stone wall; Alexander's battalion was to the north, Cabell's battalion was across Hazel Run to the south but placed so that its fire could sweep the approaches to the stone wall.

And the Federals came, towards the stone wall. From every angle the roar of Confederate artillery and musketry fire rose. French's division led, followed by Hancock's. Howard's division was hurried up out of Fredericksburg (where it had been relieved by Whipple), and made ready to go in on the right of the main attack. This was the II Corps, the Corps that never lost a gun nor a flag, led by commanders who would all lead corps before long.

The attack marched up in brigade columns. A canal drainage ditch traversed the field, and the Confederates had dismantled the bridges, forcing the attacking columns to go to the left, directly towards the stone wall.

From the time they left the cover of Fredericksburg's buildings the Federal attackers had to cross 800 yards to get to the stone wall.

French's division did not get within 60 yards of the stone wall before what was left of its men dove to the ground for cover. Hancock's division came marching through the disorganized remnants.

One officer of Hancock's division made it to within 100 feet of the stone wall. The Confederates found him there the next day. It was the farthest Union penetration.

Hancock's division went to the ground with 40% casualties.

Howard, channeled to the left by the drainage ditch, came in across the ground the other divisions

had covered. It stopped far from the wall, but at least it was not totally wrecked.

The II Corps was no more. But the attacks were not over.

Meanwhile, on the Federal left, Meade was still in the midst of the Confederate position and wondering just where his supports were.

Then Early's division struck with the Stonewall brigade on its left and Meade fought his way back out of the swamp.

As he came out into the open, fierce Confederates boiling out of the woods after him, he found out what had happened to his supports. Gibbon, deployed to his right, had missed the hole Meade

had blown in the Confederate front and so had become embroiled in a fruitless standoff with A.P. Hill's leftmost brigades. And Franklin had delayed in ordering up any other supports! Birney's division came up just as Meade fell back, and together the Federal divisions fought their way back to the Federal line and beat off the Confederate counterattack. Birney and Sickles, arriving late, took over Meade's and Gibbon's positions in the line; Meade's and Gibbon's divisions were through. The Pennsylvania Reserves would have to try to rebuild their strength in the defenses of Washington; the wrecked division was transferred out of the army within a month.

Franklin was convinced of the futility of attack; on the left the battle was over, except for the artillery duels.

On the right the IX CORPS was preparing to go into action. Sumner was an impetuous attacker. Burnside had ordered him to stay, personally, on the other side of the river, for fear the loyal old soldier would try to personally lead an attack. The order probably saved Sumner's life, but he was not at the front and could not make his own appraisal of the strength of the Confederate position. He had to go by reports—and his orders. He still meant to occupy the heights behind Fredericksburg.

Sturgis' division was sent in on the heels of the II Corps and did no better. The call went out: we've used up our troops. We need reinforcements! The V Corps started forward, while the IX Corps maneuvered in preparation for the next attack.

In the Confederate ranks all had not gone perfectly. Ransom's division had been shifted forward onto the hill and down into the lines behind the stone wall, but both Confederate generals at the stone wall—Cobb and Cooke—were casualties. More troops were stripped from the rest of the line: Kershaw went down to the stone wall, Kemper and Jenkins were sent from Pickett's division to reinforce the positions all around the stone wall.

In the pause after the repulse of the II Corps, the fight developed into a fierce artillery duel. The Confederates had the upper hand at first, but the Federals concentrated a massive battery outside of Fredericksburg and at least distracted the Confederate fire from the infantry.

The Federals were forming again to attack. The V Corps was preparing to go forward, Griffin and Humphreys' new division first, followed by Sykes' division of regulars. Getty of the IX Corps was in position as well. (Burns' division had been sent down to guard Franklin's bridge. Franklin still stayed inert, even though he now commanded 60,000 men.)

On the Confederate hill, the firing had exhausted the Washington Artillery's ammunition. Swiftly, as the Federals formed, Walton's battalion limbered up and moved out while Alexander's battalion galloped along the skyline to take its place.

Then the Federals came on. It was 4:30.

Griffins' Division came up from Hazel Run but with fire from the front and from across the run it faltered before it got close to the stone wall. To the right, Humphreys was leading his green division right over the ground of the previous attacks. His men were green, but Humphreys was an excellent general; he knew the only way to get to that stone wall was to charge without stopping to fire (a similar attack by Confederates had shattered the Union lines and won the battle of Gaines' Mill). Like a blue tide his division swept into the storm of shot and shell.

The huddled survivors of previous attacks reached up and pulled his men down as they passed, telling them not to to waste their lives.

Humphreys' attack fell apart.

Getty, starting forward after Griffin, saw what was happening and stopped.

Sykes had just formed up and was starting forward when he saw Humphreys' attack fall apart ahead of him. He was immediately ordered to assume the defensive.

The battle was over.

. . . except, perhaps, in Burnside's mind. He had never been able to handle the pressure on him, the pressure to advance, the weight of responsibility for the fate of his army and his country. Now he had to live with the responsibility for his dying soldiers, and it was made no easier by the fact that the carnage had been hopeless and pointless. He had to have a victory to make it all worthwhile.

So as the soldiers made their way back to their own lines that night, he sent out a final order: the IX Corps was to be formed for an attack on the stone wall on the morning of the 14th. Burnside himself would lead his beloved soldiers in this final attack.

Fortunately, in the clear light of morning his generals talked him out of it.

The whole army stole back across the Rappahannock two nights later during a violent storm.

Lee was disgusted. He'd wanted to bag the whole Union army.

The Battle of Fredericksburg was over.

. . . except, perhaps, in the minds of Stonewall Jackson and Ambrose Burnside.

Jackson tried first. After Meade's attack and the resultant Confederate counterattack had tapered away, the fighting on the Confederate right had degenerated into an artillery duel. Advanced Confederate batteries had wrecked havoc on Doubleday's division in particular, while massed Federal batteries kept firing storms of shot and shell from Stafford Heights across the river. Minor attacks by Early, Taliaferreo and Hood had all been driven back before they could get rolling, with the help of the unanswerable Federal cannon across the river.

As dark approached and the defeated Federal Army fell back in confusion and torment, Jackson resolved to try again. He formed his vast corps for an attack and sent out probes from the sheltered Confederate positions.

The light Confederate advance was met with such a storm of shot and shell that Jackson was forced to call off the whole attack.

CAMPAIGNS ALONG THE RAPPAHANNOCK

The previous account described the battle of Fredericksburg, one of the many failures of the Union Army in an attempt to reach Richmond. Three other battles were fought within 20 miles of Fredericksburg, all for the same reason: Chancellorsville, the Wilderness, and Spottsylvania Court House. In all four battles Robert E. Lee commanded the Confederate forces. In all four battles Lee utilized breastworks in his defense, a tactic not used in the East in a major battle prior to December, 1862.

The four campaigns had other similarities. All four attempted to surprise Lee by a flanking

ROADS
MINOR
MAJOR
SCALE
3PM–6PM
0 500 1000 1500 yards

EPILOGUE TO FREDERICKSBURG

Sumner died that winter, and Franklin was put permanently on the shelf for his lack of aggressiveness at Fredericksburg. He was the last of the McClellan clique, which did him no good when the War Department came to assess his contribution to the failure of McClellan's successor in command, and when he left an era passed away. The revolving door policy in the high command of the Army of the Potomac continued; Sigel was removed, and W. F. Smith, Dan Butterfield, and Stoneman were transferred to other assignments, to be replaced with Howard, Sedgewick, Meade and Sickles. Burnside swallowed a demotion to corps command and with his beloved IX corps was sent west, once again far from the star-crossed path of the Army of the Potomac.

Of the seven corps commanders left with the army, only two had commanded as much as a division at the start of the Peninsular Campaign, eight months ago. The rest had all commanded brigades.

It was the time of the young lions, and as was fitting the one that roared the loudest— "Fighting Joe" Hooker—would have the first crack at commanding. Hooker was a man with ideas. In testimony before Congress he had already assailed his predecessors' practice of moving the whole army together so that Lee could always deduce where they were going. And Hooker was the man who had repeatedly urged Burnside to cross by the fords above Fredericksburg . . . The spring might hold some surprises for Robert E. Lee. Lee would certainly have some surprises for Fighting Joe Hooker.

With a sigh of relief the army settled down to wait for the good weather to return.

movement. In the Fredericksburg campaign Burnside ordered Sumner to march to Falmouth. The rapid march (40 miles in 2½ days compared to 5 miles per day by McClellan) left Lee flatfooted. Burnside's subsequent actions reversed his initial advantage. Had he been another Jackson and crossed the Rappahannock, or another Sherman and not started the campaign until he was ready, Lee would have been in trouble. Pontoons or no pontoons the Rappahannock was low enough to ford. The Confederates knew of a ford 100 yards above Fredericksburg that could be used during low tide. Even if the Union army did not know about this ford, it knew of many others further upstream.

In the Chancellorsville campaign Hooker made a brilliant maneuver around Lee's left flank. By tightening security, keeping his plans to himself, and limiting newspaper reporters, Hooker plugged many of the leaks used by Lee to find out the Union army movements. Lee was not only caught flatfooted; he was out-generaled. If Hooker showed any aggressiveness at all the Confederates would have had to retire to the North Anna or be crushed.

Because Spottsylvania occurred immediately after the battle of the Wilderness many historians have included both battles in one campaign. On May 4, 1864 Grant began his march southward. The route selected was completely around Lee's right flank. Unopposed in his crossing of the Rapidan, Grant struck boldly on the direct road to Richmond. Lee had no choice but to attack or abandon his position. The result was the battle of the Wilderness. On May 8, 1864 Grant again pivoted his army around the right flank of the Confederate position. Lee interposed his Confederates along the line of march. In the ensuing battle most of Johnson's Confederate division was taken prisoner and many casualties resulted on both sides. With Grant's third march to the right of Lee, the battle of Spottsylvania was over. It could be broken into two three day phases separated by a period of rain.

Besides the area, defensive tactics, and offensive strategy involved, the organization used by the Union commanders was somewhat the same in each campaign. At Fredericksburg, Burnside divided the Army of the Potomac into sub-armies called Grand Divisions. At Chancellorsville Hooker's sub-armies were wings commanded by himself and Sedgewick. Unlike Burnside's concept, Sedgewick commanded his wing plus his Sixth Corps. Since the organization was more flexible, this was an advantage. Unfortunately, Hooker's inability and subsequent requisitioning of all of Sedgewick's troops except for one corps and one division, probably lost him the battle. In the Wilderness and Spottsylvania Grant's sub-armies were the Army of the Potomac under Meade and the Ninth Corps under Burnside. Until the consolidation of the Ninth Corps with the Army of the Potomac after Spottsylvania, the Ninth Corps was really a separate "sub-army."

Still another similarity was the relative numbers of the opposing forces. In all of the battles the Confederates were outnumbered by just about the same ratio. If we include the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps under Siegel which were available to Burnside during the later part of the Fredericksburg campaign, the Union army outnumbered the Confederates just about 2 to 1 in every case. It is a great tribute to Lee's ability that all of the battles were either Confederate victories or drawn battles. A lesser general would have lost them all.

A MILITARY HANDBOOK OF THE CIVIL WAR

The other aspects that characterized military maneuvers in the Civil War were weapons, tactics, doctrine, chivalry, and leadership. By far the most used weapon was the rifled musket. Not only was it

used by most of the troops (the infantry) but it also produced the most casualties of any weapon in use. Although the United States produced most of the weapons, early seizure of US armories within the southern states kept the Confederacy well equipped. As long as the Confederacy could win battles they would remain well equipped. Captured Union weapons taken from battlefield casualties was a prime source of Confederate weaponry. This could not make up for the South's ebbing manpower but it did keep the Confederacy going.

A comparison of small arms would reveal that the 1861 Springfield rifled musket had an effective range of 350 yards, equal or greater than any other Civil War small arm. The 1822 musket used by most of the CSA militia had an effective range of only 150

yards. But effective range was not the only consideration. Rate of fire, weight of the weapon, caliber, and reliability were also important. Obviously the Spencer Repeater was the most cherished small arm since it was a breechloading rifle capable of over six times the rate of fire of the Springfield. Its range was equal to the Springfield and it carried a light, more manageable bullet.

Of the cavalry weapons the ones most often used were the carbine. Confederate units used the Enfield, a muzzle loader; while the Federal units used the Sharps, a breechloading weapon. Both weapons had an effective range of 250 yards but the Sharps had three times the rate of fire of the Enfield. In defense the cavalry were much more powerful since they fought dismounted. Accurate firing on

STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES IN EACH OF THE FOUR CAMPAIGNS

(numbers may vary slightly from unit counter combat factors to be consistent with design techniques used in the *CHANCELLORSVILLE* Game)

FREDERICKSBURG

UNION (strength interpolation excluding officers)	men	CONFEDERATE (present for duty)	
II/Hancock	5006	I/Anderson	8745
II/Howard	5414	I/Hood	7969
II/French	4089	I/McLaws	8640
IX/Burns	3717	I/Pickett	8216
IX/Sturgis	4630	I/Ransom	4116
IX/Getty	3810	II/Early	8529
R/Pleasonton	3528	II/APHill	12091
III/Birney	4887	II/DHHill	9465
III/Sickles	4337	II/Taliaferro	5514
III/Whipple	2536	Stuart (−)	4000
V/Griffin	5818		
V/Sykes	6822		
V/Humphreys	4500		
C/Averill	2169		
I/Doubleday	6186		
I/Gibbon	4654		
I/Meade	4000		
VI/Brooks	6318		
VI/Howe	6764		
VI/Newton	6764		
L/Bayard	3407		
L/arty	18(3)4(10) 40(N)		
R/arty	6(3)8(10) 2(12)36(N)		
III/arty	6(10)24(N)		
V/arty	14(3)6(10) 22(N)		
A/rgt	14(3)18(10) 6(20)		
A/rgt c	18(3)6(10) 14(N)		
A/lft c	12(10)8(20) 7(4½)		
A/lft	34(3)8(20)		

KEY:
8(20)–first number is the number of guns:8

CHANCELLORSVILLE

UNION (present for duty)		CONFEDERATE (present for duty)	
ICorps	16908	I/Anderson	8370
IICorps	16893	I/McLaws	8665
IIICorps	18721	II/APHill	11751
VCorps	15824	II/Rodes	10063
VICorps	23667	II/Early	8596
XICorps	12977	II/Colston	6987
XIICorps	13450		
CavCorps	11541		

(4½):4½" siege guns (N):12 lb Napoleons (12): 12 lb howitzers
(3):3" rifles (10):10 lb Parrots (20): 20 lb Parrots

TIMES NEEDED TO CONSTRUCT FORTIFICATIONS AND BRIDGES

TYPE OF FORTIFICATION OR BRIDGE	TIME NEEDED FOR CONSTRUCTION
Shelter trench 2' x 1¼' deep	10 to 20 minutes
Gun-pit on crest	1 hour
Simple field work	6 to 12 hours
Hasty redoubt	18 hours
Pontoon Bridge	2 to 3 yards per minute
Bridging a 10' to 12' wide brook	10 minutes
100' Military suspension bridge	16 hours

WILDERNESS

UNION (present for duty)		CONFEDERATE (present for duty)	
II/Barlow	8114	I/Kershaw	4000
II/Gibbon	6709	I/Field	6000
II/Birney	7203	II/Early	4538
II/Mott	4972	II/Johnson	5400
V/Griffin	8779	II/Rodes	7141
V/Robinson	5319	III/Anderson	6946
V/Crawford	3503	III/Heth	7464
V/Wadsworth	6821	III/Wilcox	7789
VI/Wright	7740	Cav/Hampton	3217
VI/Getty	9338	Cav/FLee	2842
VI/Ricketts	5332	Cav/WLee	2438
IX/Stevenson	3221		
IX/Potter	5511		
IX/Willcox	5164		
IX/Ferrero	3727		
IX/Marshall	3475		
Cav/Torbert	6111		
Cav/Gregg	5056		
Cav/Wilson	3489		

SPOTTSYLVANIA

UNION (minus losses from the Wilderness)		CONFEDERATE (minus losses from the Wilderness)	
II/Barlow	7233	ICorps	less than 9545
II/Gibbon	5952	IICorps	16769
II/Birney	9234	IIICorps	less than 21153
V/Griffin	7031	CavCorps	less than 8497
V/Robinson	4527		
V/Crawford	2930		
V/Wadsworth	4813		
VI/Wright	6712		
VI/Getty	6344		
VI/Ricketts	4341		
IX/Stevenson	2686		
IX/Potter	4949		
IX/Willcox	4563		
IX/Ferrero	3727		
IX/Marshall	3466		
Cav/Torbert	5796		
Cav/Gregg	4895		
Cav/Wilson	3260		

horseback left much to be desired. It is no wonder that there were fewer cavalry charges against infantry in the Civil War than in the Napoleonic era.

A study of target practice reports, corrected for battlefield effects reveals the casualty causing ability of small arms. Within 100 yards of the defender, 1000 men in skirmish order could produce 3000 hits on moving targets before they (the attackers) could reach their objective. Even at 4000 yards, 1000 men could hit 2 targets in motion. The hit effects dropped sharply after 1200 yards but they were still present even at that range.

The table above shows the relative effect of various weapons in battlefield situations. Unusual as it may seem the artillery was a much less effective casualty producer than small arms. The real effect was psychological. No one wants to charge a sawed-off shot gun. Double canister from a 12 lb. Napoleon had the same effect and could be called the "machinegun" of the era. Even though the gatling gun was the first real machinegun it was not used during the Civil War to any great extent (even though it was available).

Artillery was of three types: siege, field, and horse. Furthermore there were smoothbores and rifled cannon; guns, howitzers, and mortars; muzzle loaders and breechloaders. In effect artillery was categorized by mobility, range, trajectory, and protection to the artillerymen. Remarkably, indirect fire was not used even though howitzers and mortars had the ability to fire over certain heights. The Whitworth rifled cannon was to the artillery what the Spencer was to the foot soldier. Because it was a long range rifled breechloader it was reliable, effective at extreme ranges, and offered protection to the gunners. The only limitation was its total lack of cannister.

The tactics of the period did not keep pace with the change in weaponry. Armies still attacked in closed formation, wave after wave. The effective range of the rifled musket had more than tripled since the last war and the casualties they produced were shocking. Open formations would have negated some of the defensive advantage that was further enhanced by fortification. The defensive tactics at the beginning of the war consisted of standing and firing in line (much like the Revolutionary War). By December, 1862 this had changed. Soldiers realized that any type of cover was better than none. They dug rifle pits, redoubts, and breastworks. At Fredericksburg they burnt bridges to channel attacks. In most cases the defender had time to fortify. In some cases such as Hooker's flank march and Jackson's flank attack the defenders did not have time.

Besides digging the defender utilized converging fire. Those positions that could not be attacked from certain angles made excellent redoubts for the

MARCH RATES ON THE BATTLEFIELD IN YARDS PER MINUTE

TYPE OF MARCH TIME	INFANTRY	CAVALRY	ARTILLERY
Quick time and walk	86	110	86-110
"Double" and trot	150	220	150-220
Run and gallop	165	320	165-320
Charge	180	700	180-700
Advancing and firing	50		
General line from cover to cover	20-25		

artillery. In effect the attacker was rushing his flank into the defensive line. As one can see, only the front ranks could fire. It does not matter who is moving. This is really a flank attack in reverse.

A third defensive tactic was the mobile reserve. Breakthroughs were quickly crushed by counter-attacking formations. At Fredericksburg this meant building the Military Road behind Jackson's position (changing it from exterior to interior lines). Even though Meade and Gibbon smashed A.P. Hill's position, Early's division was able to counter-attack to restore the situation.

During most of the era the basic offensive maneuver was a closed formation attack, in open terrain against the enemy front, flank, or rear. The basic variation was speed of execution. To aid the attack surprise or artillery bombardment were often used. Jackson and Lee understood the changes in defensive tactics. They used concealed attacks as a viable offensive weapon. At Chancellorsville and the Wilderness Lee was able to overcome numerical inferiority by masking his attacking force in the densely wooded wilderness. The same effect could have been reached by night attacks, but they were not used for some strange reason.

Later in the war engineers were used for offensive maneuvers. Instead of laying pontoon bridges they were digging tunnels and planting explosives. "The Crater" should have been a Union victory. It was sound in theory but slow in execution.

The last major offensive technique, and the slowest and most cumbersome, was siege. Vicksburg and Richmond were both taken this way.

Much of the tactics depended on doctrine and chivalry, a failure to change traditional ideas with the change in weaponry. At first both sides considered the Civil War a war of the "best man" where the "best man's" ideas would give victory. With Sherman's march to the sea, Grant's constant pressure on Lee, and the blockade, the Civil War became the first total, modern war. Most of the chivalry was gone because chivalry affected a general's common sense. It would have been very simple for the attacker to crawl up to the defender's position in open order before executing their attack. Similarly, night attacks should have been used to offset the defensive advantage of the rifled musket.

But neither of these methods seemed fair. They did not give the defender a chance to fight man to man in the open. At times even the defender used chivalry. Remarkable, but true, the gatling gun was available in considerable quantity to the Union Army at Chickamauga. Rosecrans remarked that he did not use the weapon because it would be unsportsmanlike (conduct) to mow down the attacker. This sounds more like a football referee than a general!

On the Confederate side, Polk lost at least one battle because of his old ideas. He had to hold up the attack to eat breakfast. No one should go to battle on an empty stomach!

Leadership is one of the most controversial subjects connected with the Civil War. Most military historians would agree that Confederate corps and army commanders at the beginning of the war were, on the average, better commanders than their Federal counterparts. Jefferson Davis did a fine job in his initial choice of commanders. Eventually many competent Confederate generals were killed in battle and the average quality went down. Furthermore, poor Union generals were killed in battle or transferred to less important departments. By the end of the war, the quality in both armies was high. There is no doubt that at that time, the Union generals were at least equal to their Confederate counterparts.

On the regimental, brigade, and divisional level most of the incompetant commanders were gone by December, 1862. Both the USA and CSA governments realized that politicians did not make the best officers. By then the governments had lifted most of their restrictions on the military appointment of officers.

Al Nofi wrote an excellent article on the leadership capabilities of Civil War generals. The chart presented below expands his chart and should be of particular interest to many Civil War game designers.

Some definitions are in order. Judgement is a combination of both aggressiveness (carrying out orders or speed of execution) and reliability (whether the commander will obey the orders or not). Tactics, both offensive and defensive, rates the general's ability to conduct tactical maneuvers in battle, or prevent maneuver of the enemy.

THE SCENARIOS: RULES

All of the campaigns along the Rappahannock: Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Wilderness, and Spottsylvania; could be transformed into game situations by simply adding scenarios to Avalon Hill's *CHANCELLORSVILLE*. However, many of those rules need modification to reflect the changing nature of warfare from one campaign to the next. Notably leadership, fortification, victory conditions, and initial deployment have to be changed, modified, or added. The following rules reflect these changes:

LEADERSHIP CAPABILITIES

UNION GENERAL	off tac	def tac	judgement
Fremont*	0	0	5
Grant	0	0	6
Halleck	0	−1	3
McClellan	0	−1	4
Meade	0	−1	5
Scott*	0	0	3
Sheridan	+2	−2	5
Sherman	−1	+1	6
Thomas	+1	−2	3
Wool*	0	0	3
Banks	−1	+1	4
Blaire	0	0	5
Blunt	0	−1	4
Buell	0	0	3
Burnside	−2	0	4
Butler	−2	+2	2
Butterfield	−1	+1	4
Canby*	0	0	4
Couch	0	0	5
Crittenden*	0	0	4
Crook*	0	0	4
Curtis*	0	0	4
Davis*	0	0	4
Dix*	0	0	3
Dodge	0	−1	5
Doubleday	−1	0	3
Elliot*	0	0	4
Emory*	0	0	4
Franklin	0	0	3
Gibbon*	0	0	4
Gilbert*	0	0	4
Gillmore*	0	0	4
Granger	0	0	5
Hancock	0	−2	5
Heintzelman	0	0	4
Hooker	0	0	4
Howard	−1	+1	4
Humphreys*	+1	−1	4
Hunter*	0	0	4
Hurlbut*	0	0	4
Keyes*	0	0	3
Logan	0	0	5
Mansfield*	0	0	4
Manson	0	0	4
McClernand	−2	+1	3
McCook*	+1	−1	4
McDowell*	+1	−1	4
McPherson	0	0	5
Mitchel	−1	+1	4
Ord*	0	0	4
Palmer*	0	0	4
Parke	0	−1	4
Patterson*	0	0	2
Pope	−1	+1	4
Porter	0	−1	6
Ransom*	0	0	4
Reno	0	0	5
Reynolds	+1	−1	6
Ricketts*	0	0	4
Rosecrans*	0	−1	4
Schofield*	0	0	4
Sedgewick	+1	−1	5
Sickles	0	0	5f
Sigel*	−1	+1	4
Slocum	0	0	5
A Smith*	0	0	5
T Smith*	0	0	4
W Smith	0	−1	2
Steele*	0	0	4
Stoneman	0	0	4
Sumner	−1	0	6
Sykes	0	0	4
Terry*	0	0	4
Wallace*	0	0	4
Warren	0	−1	5
Washburn*	0	0	4
Weitzel*	0	0	4
Willcox*	0	0	4
Williams*	0	0	4
Wood*	0	0	5
Wright	0	0	5

CONF. GENERAL	off tac	def tac	judgement
Beauregard	0	−1	5
Bragg	0	+1	5
Hood	+1	0	5f
A Johnston	+1	−1	5
J Johnston	0	−2	4
R Lee	+1	−2	6
K Smith*	0	0	2
R Anderson*	0	0	4
Breckinridge*	0	0	4
Buckner	+1	−1	4
Cheatham	0	0	5
Crittenden*	0	0	5
Early	0	−1	6
Ewell	0	0	4
Floyd*	−1	+1	2
Forrest	+2	−1	6
Gatlin*	0	0	4
J Gordon	0	0	5
Hardee	+1	−1	6
A Hill	0	0	5f
D Hill	+1	0	4
Hindman	−1	+1	5
Holmes	−1	+1	4
Huger	0	+1	4
Jackson	+2	−1	6
S Lee	0	0	6
Longstreet	+2	−2	3
Magruder*	0	0	4
McCown*	0	0	3
Pemberton*	0	0	3
Polk	−1	+1	3
Price*	0	0	5
Ripley	0	0	5
G Smith	0	−1	3
Stewart	0	0	6
Taylor	+1	0	5
Tilghman*	0	0	4
Twiggs*	0	0	3
Van Dorn*	+1	0	4
Zollicoffer*	−1	+1	4

CONFEDERATE CAVALRY COMMANDERS

	off tac	def tac	judgement
Hampton*	0	0	5
F Lee	+1	−1	6
Stuart	+1	−1	6f
Wheeler	+2	−1	5

UNION CAVALRY COMMANDERS

	off tac	def tac	judgement
Merritt*	0	0	4
Pleasonton*	0	0	5
Standley*	0	0	4
Torbert*	+1	0	4
Wilson	+1	−1	6

KEY:

abbreviations: off tac = offensive tactics;
def tac = defensive tactics;

ratings: off tac: +2 = excellent, +1 = good,
0 = average, −1 = mediocre, −2 = poor

def tac: −2 = excellent, −1 = good,
0 = average, +1 = mediocre, +2 = poor

judgement and comments: 6 = excellent, 5 =
very good, 4 = good, 3 = below average,
2 = poor, 1 = terrible

f means that the tendency is also toward
considerable variation

* indicates that the ratings are subject to
foolhardy actions

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1. Omit section IX: **INITIAL UNION MOVEMENT**

2. Omit section X: **VICTORY CONDITIONS** and replace it with IX: **VICTORY CONDITIONS.**

The player with the larger number of victory points at the end of the game is declared the winner. Victory points are awarded during play for exiting friendly units (see rule #4) and/or at the end of the game for friendly units still on the mapboard (1 point to the Union player for each Union combat factor; 3 points to the Confederate player for each Confederate combat factor).

3. Omit section XI: **PREPARATION FOR PLAY** and replace it with X: **PREPARE FOR PLAY.**

Both players place their units on the hexes indicated on the INITIAL DEPLOYMENT CHART for the scenario being played.

4. Add section XI: **EXITING THE MAP.**

Union units may exit the map from hex CC47 or hex WW53 for victory points. They may also exit south edge hexes for no victory points. To exit the map units must expend 1 movement point of the unit's movement allowance after it reaches an exit hex. Union units may only receive victory points when they exit the map from hexes CC47 or WW53 and can trace an unbroken line of hexes from the exit hex to the north edge. The route must include a row of hexes from the exit hex, along a road to Fredericksburg, then across an emplaced pontoon bridge that is adjacent to Fredericksburg, and along a road on the northern side of the river to the north edge of the mapboard. This line cannot be broken by enemy zones of control. For each Union combat factor exited, the Union player receives 4 victory points.

Confederate units may exit the map from the north edge hexes by expending 1 movement point of the unit's movement allowance. Confederate units need not trace a path of hexes to the opposite side of the mapboard; however, they only receive victory points for exiting from hexes W12 or JJ19. The Confederate player receives 5 victory points for each friendly combat factor exited from these hexes.

Both players may reenter exited units from their exit hexes at any time. Of course, the victory points awarded for exited units are revoked until the units are re-exited under the victory point conditions. Units may reenter on enemy controlled hexes but not on top of enemy units. Furthermore, units may only exit the map during the movement portion of their turn. Units forced off the map as a result of combat are eliminated instead. For ease of play, it is recommended that exited units be kept in small piles adjacent to their exit hexes. Those that have fulfilled the victory point conditions should be "turned over."

5. Add section XII: **REINFORCEMENTS.**

On the INITIAL DEPLOYMENT CHART you will find units available at the beginning of the scenario and those units that are reinforcements. Reinforcements are brought in during the player-turn indicated on the chart or a later player turn at the owning player's discretion. Units enter on the specified hex, unless it is blocked by an enemy unit (not zone of control), in which case the reinforcements may enter on the next unblocked hex looking clockwise along the edge of the mapboard. Reinforcements as well as reentered units must count the initial entrance hex against their movement allowance.

6. Add section XIII: **FORTIFICATIONS.**

In addition to those fortifications initially placed on the mapboard, both players may build fortifications. At the end of any player-turn that a friendly unit does not move during two

consecutive night game-turns, the owning player may place a fortification counter on top of those friendly unit(s) that did not move for those two consecutive night game-turns. Thus, fortifications may be built on hexes containing those units that do not move during two consecutive night game-turns and all consecutive game-turns until the fortification is built. If on any turn, between the current turn and the two consecutive night game-turns the unit moves, it may not build a fortification.

7. Omit OPTIONAL RULE SECTION IA3 and replace it with:

Command control radius, maximum lengths are included on the headquarters units, except the Union Army or Army Group counter which commands the entire army and has a command control radius of 4 for reducing disruption, and the Confederate Army counter which has a command control radius of 8 for reducing disruption. (Note that divisional headquarters do not have a command control radius for reducing disruption using the scenarios.)

8. Add OPTIONAL RULE SECTION ID: **FOLLOWING ORDERS**.

At the beginning of each player-turn the owning player rolls the die once for each friendly headquarters unit that is on the mapboard and within the printed command control radius of its parent headquarters (higher echelon). Compare this number with the judgement rating of the headquarters unit. If the die roll is greater than the judgement rating, the headquarters and all its subordinate units may not move during that game-turn (although they may attack, defend, advance or retreat as a result of combat). Headquarters out of range of the parent headquarters unit may not move in that game-turn. Note that Army headquarters have a limited command control radius for disruption removal but an unlimited one for movement of subordinate units. When the chain of command involves more than one level (*i.e.*, Grand Divisions and Corps or Army of the Potomac and Corps) the player rolls first to see if the Grand Division (higher echelon) can move and if it can, then each individual Corps. Obviously, if the Grand Division cannot move, its subordinate Corps cannot move either. Note that in the Chancellorsville scenario Lee represents the Army headquarters and the First Corps headquarters. Thus for movement of the First Corps units, it has a Command Control radius of 8, but for movement of the Second Corps Headquarters it has a unlimited radius.

Most of the cavalry units moved independent of the rest of the army (except the Union cavalry at Fredericksburg). To reflect this fact, judgement ratings have been provided for cavalry units. Players roll for each cavalry unit separately, not for the parent Cavalry Corps headquarters unit. Furthermore, when Corps commanders were killed, cavalry corps commanders were sometimes called to take command of the infantry corps. Thus, if an army corps headquarters unit is eliminated, the cavalry corps headquarters may replace the eliminated corps headquarters in order to move its sub-units.

The one exception to the above is a roll of "1" for headquarters units with an "f" next to their judgement rating (meaning foolhardy). If a 1 is rolled, all subordinate units within the command control radius of the headquarters which the 1 was rolled for, must attack some enemy unit in that game-turn. If a subordinate unit cannot move in to an attacking position, its movement is not restricted.

SCENARIO 1 (FREDERICKSBURG) game starts May 1, 6 am (really December 13, 1862)

UNION ARMY
Burnside (Army HQ) — LL36
Hunt (HQ), Hays — HH33
Trumbull — NN42
Sumner (HQ), — IX, V — JJ36
Couch (HQ), II, Howard — HH36
Hancock, French — HH37
Willcox (HQ), Getty, Sturgis — II38
Burns, Brooks — II39
Pleasonton — KK36
Hooker (HQ), Stoneman (HQ) — LL41
Sickles, III — LL41
Whipple — JJ35
Birney — MM42
Butterfield (HQ) — LL37
Griffin — KK38
Sykes — II33
Humphreys — MM37
Averell — LL38
Franklin (HQ), Doubleday, Bayard — LL44
Reynolds (HQ), Gibbon, Meade — MM45
I — KK42
Smith (HQ), VI, Newton — JJ41
Howe — KK43
emplaced Pontoons — II36, JJ38, LL42
Assault Boats — KK38, MM42

CONFEDERATE ARMY
fort, Anderson (HQ), 3 2-4's of 1 Corps — FF35
fort, Ransom, 2-4, 1-4 of 1 Corps — GG36
fort, Longstreet (HQ), Walton, Alexander, 2-4 of 1 Corps — GG37
fort, McLaws (HQ), 2-6 artillery, 3 2-4's of 1 Corps — GG39
fort, Lee (HQ), 2 2-6 artillery, Cabell, Cutts, Nelson — HH40
fort — HH41
Pickett — HH42
fort, Hood — JJ45
fort, Brown, Brockenbrough, 2 2-4's of 2 Corps — LL47
2-4 of 2 Corps — LL48
2-4 of 2 Corps — MM47
2-4 of 2 Corps — MM48
fort, APHill (HQ), Walker, 2 2-4's of 2 Corps — NN47
Jackson (HQ), Taliaferro (HQ), 2 2-4's and 1-4 of 2 Corps — MM50
Jones, Latimer — PP51
Pelham — QQ49
Stuart — RR48
Early, DHHill — RR51

SCENARIO 2 (CHANCELLORSVILLE) game starts April 30, 6 am

UNION ARMY
Hooker (Army HQ), XII — E3
Reynolds (HQ), Pontoon — QQ45
Wadsworth — OO44
Robinson, I — PP44
Doubleday — PP45
Couch (HQ), Hancock, French — CC30
Gibbon — KK37
II — DD30
Sickles (HQ), Birney, III — NN42
Berry — NN43
Meade (HQ), Griffin, Sykes — F4
V, Humphreys — G5
Sedgewick (HQ), Pontoon — MM41
Brooks, VI — LL40
Howe, Burnham — KK39
Newton — LL41
Howard (HQ), emplaced Pontoon — C3
Devens, XI — D3
Steinwehr — B3
Shurz — B4
Slocum, (HQ), Williams, Geary — E4
Pleasonton — B5
Hunt (HQ), Res, Res — HH32
Pontoons — FF31, JJ35
Assault Boats — both on HH31

CONFEDERATE ARMY
Lee (HQ), Semmes, Cabell — GG40
Anderson (HQ), Perry — Y34
Mahone — T25
Wilcox, fort — CC33
Posey — Q24
Wright, Kershaw — CC47
McLaws (HQ), Barksdale, fort — GG36
Wofford — AA36
Alexander, Walton — FF36
Hardaway — DD33
Jackson (HQ), Rodes, Carter — SS51
APHill, Walker — UU51
Early, Andrews, fort — NN47
Colston, Jones — WW51
Nelson, Cutts — FF37
McIntosh, Brown — MM50
forts — LL47, JJ45, HH40, HH41, GG39, GG37, FF35

REINFORCEMENTS: CONFEDERATE: Stuart (HQ), FLee   3 pm Apr 30 on A20
REINFORCEMENTS: UNION: Averill 9 am on A7

JUDGEMENTS RATINGS FOR CAVALRY: Averill — 2
Pleasonton — 5, FLee — 6, Stuart (HQ) — 6f

SCENARIO 3 (THE WILDERNESS) game starts April 30 6 am (really May 5, 1864)

UNION ARMY
Torbert — C12
Ricketts — E14
Wright, Getty — E15
Sedgewick (HQ), VI — F16
Wilson — C20
Crawford — E23
IR horse — F26
V — H22
Warren (HQ), Griffin — I23
Robinson, Wadsworth — J23
Barlow — O29
Gibbon — O28
Hancock (HQ) — P28
Grant (Army HQ), Meade (HQ) — Q28
II — Q29
Birney — Q26
IIR, IIIR — S28
Mott — R28
Sheridan (HQ), Gregg — T32
Hunt (HQ), IR, IIR horse — Q27

CONFEDERATE ARMY
Ewell (HQ), Early, Rodes — B20
Page, Cutshaw, Braxton, Hardaway — A20
Johnson, Nelson — B22
Heth — C24
Lee (HQ), APHill (HQ), Wilcox, Anderson, Poague — C25
McIntosh, Pegram, Cutts, Richardson — B24
Hampton — Q35

REINFORCEMENTS: CONFEDERATE: Apr 30, 6 am on A24: Longstreet (HQ), Cabell, Haskell, Huger; I37: Stuart (HQ), FLee, WLee; May 1, 1st night on A24: Field, Kershaw, Breathed

REINFORCEMENTS: UNION: Apr 30, 6 am on A10: Burnside (HQ), Stevenson; 12 pm on A10: Willcox; 3 pm on A10: Potter; 6 pm on A10: Ferrero, Marshall, IX

Pontoons — D13, J17, emplaced

INITIAL DEPLOYMENT CHART

SCENARIO 4a (SPOTTSYLVANIA part 1) game starts April 30, 6 am (really May 8, 1864)

UNION ARMY

Ferrero, Pontoon — M21
Burnside (HQ), Potter — M21
Stevenson — J23
Marshall, IX — J24
Hancock (HQ), II — K25
Willcox — L24
forts — H24, I25, J26, K27, L28
Birney — J26
Gibbon — K27
Barlow — L27
Getty — N29
Grant (Army HQ), Meade (HQ) — O26
Torbert, VI — R28
Sedgewick (HQ), Ricketts, Wright — R29
Wilson, IR horse — T32
Hunt (HQ), IR, IIR horse — R33
IIR, IIIR — Q33
Sheridan (HQ), Gregg — O33
Crawford, Wadsworth — Q35
Warren (HQ), Griffin, Robinson — R36
V — P34

CONFEDERATE ARMY

fort, Early, Page — F21
Ewell (HQ), Nelson, Hardaway — E21
fort, Johnson — F22
fort, Rodes, Cutshaw — F23
fort, Braxton — F24
fort, Pegram — G25
Huger, Cabell — C25
Lee (HQ), Anderson (HQ), Haskell — G26
fort, Field, McIntosh — H26
fort, Kershaw, Poague — I27
Breathed — I34
Early (HQ), Cutts — L34
Wilcox, Anderson, Heth — M34
WLee — T36
Stuart (HQ), FLee, Hampton — T38
Richardson — F26

emplaced Pontoons — II36, J17, D13

SCENARIO 4b (SPOTTSYLVANIA part 2) game starts April 30, 6 am (really May 16, 1864)

UNION ARMY

forts — S36, T37
Barlow, Gibbon, Grant (HQ), Meade (HQ) — U37
fort, Ricketts — U38
fort, Birney — V39
fort, Stevenson — W40
Burnside (HQ), Marshall — W39
Willcox, Potter — X40
Robinson, Griffin — Y41
Warren (HQ), Crawford, Wadsworth — Y42
Wright — Z42
Wright (HQ), VI, Getty — Z41
II, V — Z40
Ferrero — GG37
Pontoons — II36, II37

CONFEDERATE ARMY

Cabell — R39
fort, Huger — S39
fort, Kershaw, Haskell — T39
fort, Johnson, Braxton — U39
fort, Ewell (HQ), Early, Ransom, Page, Hardaway — U40
Lee (HQ), Poague, McIntosh, Pegram, Cutts, Richardson — U41
fort, Early (HQ), Heth, Wilcox, Anderson — V41
fort, Nelson, Cutshaw — W42
Anderson (HQ), Field — W43

9. Add OPTIONAL RULE SECTION VI: TACTICAL ABILITY.

To reflect the tactical ability of Civil War Corps and Army commanders, headquarters units have been rated on offensive and defensive tactics. Whenever a headquarters unit is in a battle where it is attacking enemy units, the die roll is modified by the number on the offensive rating. Whenever a headquarters is in a battle, defending, the die roll is modified by the defensive rating. Note that Confederate divisional headquarters do not have tactical ratings.

The die roll may never exceed 6 nor be less than 1. Only the higher echelon headquarters may affect the battle if two are in the same battle. If headquarters are of the same rank, the owning player has the choice of which headquarters will affect the die roll.

OFFENSIVE RATING
DEFENSIVE RATING
JUDGEMENT RATING
COMMAND CONTROL RADIUS

MOUNTING THE UNITS

Extra units have been included in the insert section of the *GENERAL* for the scenarios. They *supplement* the units included in *CHANCELLORSVILLE*. In scenarios where only the Confederate First and Second Corps are present, Third Corps brigades can be used to represent First Corps brigades. Furthermore, brigade commander names have not been included on the brigade counters since the counters are used for all of the scenarios. The following diagram will help explain numbers on the unit counters as they pertain to the extra rules included in this article:

Scenario
Brigades
Parent "Sub" Army
Parent Corps

You will also find the number of subordinate counters for each Confederate division listed on the divisional unit. This additional information has been included for ease of play.

To mount the units simply adhere the unit sheet to a blank unit counter sheet (available from Avalon Hill) with contact cement. Then cut the counters out with a razor blade from the back of the unit counter sheet. Now you are ready to recreate the four battles along the Rappahannock. Solitaire play can be just as much fun as a two-player version.

Game counter sheet (unit markers).

Left (blue) section — Union:

Unit	Label	Values
Grant	W,S HQ	0-0 / 0-8
Burnside	F Pot	-2-0 / 0-8
Hooker	C Pot	0-0 / 0-8
Meade	W,S Po	0-1 5-4 / 0-8
Meade	G Po	0-1 / 0-8
Sumner	F RGD	-1-0 6-4 / 0-8
Hooker	F CGD	0-0 4-4 / 0-8
Franklin	F LCD	0-0 3-4 / 0-8
Reynolds	F,C,G I	-1-1 6-4 / 0-8 L
Couch	FC II	0-0 5-4 / 0-8 R
Stoneman	F III	0-0 4-4 / 0-8 C
Butterfield	F V	-1-1 4-4 / 0-8 C
Sedgwick	C,G,W,S VI	-1-1 5-4 / 0-8 P
Willcox	F IX	0-0 4-4 / 0-8 R
Sickles	C,G III	0-0 5-4 / 0-8
Meade	C V	0-1 5-4 / 0-8
Smith	F VI	0-1 2-4 / 0-8 L
Howard	C,G XI	-1-1 4-4 / 0-8
Slocum	C,C XII	0-0 5-4 / 0-8
Stoneman	C Cav	0-0 4-4 / 0-8
Hancock	G II	0-2 6-4 / 0-8 P
Sykes	G V	0-0 4-4 / 0-8
Pleasonton	G Cav	0-0 5-4 / 0-8
Warren	W,S V	0-1 5-4 / 0-8 P
Burnside	W,S IX	-2-0 4-4 / 0-8
Sheridan	W,S Cav	+2-2 5-4 / 0-8 P
Wright	S VI	0-0 5-4 / 0-8 P
Hancock	F	5-4 R2
Howard	F	6-4 R2
French	F	4-4 R2
Burns	F =	5-6 R2
Burns	F	4-4 R9
Sturgis	F	5-4 R9
Getty	F	4-4 R9
IX	F	5-6 R9
Pleasonton	F	4-8 R
Birney	F	5-4 C3
Sickles	F	5-4 C3
Whipple	F	3-4 C3
III	F	6-6 C3
Griffin	F	6-4 C5
Sykes	F	7-4 C5
Humphreys	F	5-4 C5
Averell	F >	5-6 C5
	F	2-8 C
Doubleday	F	7-4 L1
Gibbon	F	5-4 L1
Meade	F	5-4 L1
	F -	7-6 L1
Brooks	F	7-4 L6
Howe	F	7-4 L6
Newton	F	7-4 L6
	F >	7-6 L6
Bayard	F	3-8 L
Hays	F	6-6 A
Trumbull	S	2-4 A
Barlow	W	8-4 P2
Gibbon	W	7-4 P2
Birney	W	7-4 P2
Mott	W	5-4 P2
	W,S =	8-6 P2
Griffin	W	9-4 P5
Robinson	W	5-4 F5
Crawford	W	4-4 P5
Wadsworth	W	7-4 P5
	W,S >	8-6 P5
Wright	W	8-4 L6
Getty	W	9-4 P6
Ricketts	W	5-4 F6
VI	W,S	7-6 P6
Torbert	W,S	6-8 P6
Gregg	W,S	5-8
Wilson	W	3-8
IR	W,S	5-8
IIR	W,S	5-8 PA
IR	W,S	2-4 PA
IIR	W,S	5-6 PA
IIIR	W,S	5-6 PA
Stevenson	W	3-4
Porter	W,S	6-4
Willcox	W	5-4
Ferrero	W	4-4
Marshall	W	3-4
IX	W,S	5-6
Barlow	S	7-4 P2
Gibbon	S	5-4 P2
Birney	S	9-4 P2
Griffin	S	7-4 P5
Potter	S	5-4
Crawford	S	3-4 P5

Right (grey) section — Confederate:

Unit	Label	Values
Lee	F,G,W,S NVa	+1-2 / 0-8
Longstreet	F,G,W I	-2-2 3-8 / 0-8
Jackson	FC II	-2-1 6-8 / 0-8 pa
Lee	C I	+1-2 6-8 / 0-8
Ewell	G,W,S II	0-0 4-8 / 0-8
A P Hill	G,W III	0-0 5f-8 / 0-8
Stuart	G,W,S Cav	+1-1 6f-8 / 0-8
Anderson	S I	0-0 4-8 / 0-8
Early	S III	0-0-1 6-8 / 0-8
Anderson	F	9-4
Hood	F	8-4
McLaws	F	8-4
Pickett	F	9-4
Ransom	F	4-4
Cabell	F	2-6
	F	2-6
	F	2-6
Walton	F	2-6
Alexander	F	3-6
Early	F	8-4
A P Hill	F	12-4
D H Hill	F	10-4
Taliaferro	F	7-4
Jones	F	3-6
Walker	F	4-6
Latimer	F	3-6
Brockenbrough	F	3-6
Brown	F	3-6
Cutts	F	2-6
Nelson	F	2-6
Stuart (-)	F	4-8
Pelham	F	3-8
Kershaw	W,S	4-4
Field	W,S	6-4
Huger	W,S	3-6
Haskell	W,S	2-6
Cabell	W,S	2-6
Early	W,S	5-4
Johnson	W,S	5-4
Rodes	W,S	7-4
Hardaway	W,S	3-6
Nelson	W,S	2-6
Braxton	W,S	2-6
Cutshaw	W,S	2-6
Page	W,S	2-6
Anderson	W,S	7-4
Heth	W,S	7-4
Wilcox	W,S	8-4
Pogue	W,S	2-6
McIntosh	W,S	2-6
Pegram	W,S	3-6
Cutts	W,S	2-6
Richardson	W,S	2-6
Hampton	W,S	3-8
Flee	W,S	3-8
W H F Lee	W,S	2-8
Breathed	W,S	3-8
		2-4
		2-4
		2-4
		2-4
		2-4
		2-4
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		1-4
		1-4
		1-4
		1-4
		1-4
		1-4
		1-4
Hood		0-8
Pick		0-8
Ran		0-8
DH		0-8
Tali		0-8
Ker		0-8
Field		0-8
Jo's		0-8
Heth		0-8
Wil		0-8
Stu		0-8
Wadsworth	S	5-4 P5
Wright	S	7-4 P6
Getty	S	6-4 P6
Ricketts	S	4-4 P6
Hunt	F,C,W,S Art	0-1 6-4 / 0-8 P
		2-8
		2-8

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Scenario Key
Fredericksburg
Chancellorsville
Wilderness
Spotsylvania

WHf Lee · C · Chambliss · 1-8	WHf Lee · C · Gordon · 1-8	I · Hood · 0-8	Hood · I · Law · 2-4	Hood · I · Anderson · 2-4	Hood · I · Robertson · 2-4	Hood · I · Benning · 2-4	I · Field · 0-8	Field · I · Jenkins · 2-4	Field · I · Anderson · 1-4	Field · I · Law · 1-4	Field · I · Gregg · 1-4	Field · I · Benning · 1-4	Pickett · I · Kemper · 2-4	Pickett · I · Armistead · 2-4	Pickett · I · Jenkins · 2-4
Pickett · I · Corse · 1-4	I · McLaws · 0-8	McLaws · I · Kershaw · 2-4	McLaws · I · Barksdale · 2-4	McLaws · I · Cobb · 2-4	McLaws · I · Semmes · 2-4	McLaws · I · Wofford · 2-4	I · Kershaw · 0-8	Kershaw · I · Henagan · 1-4	Kershaw · I · Humphrey · 1-4	Kershaw · I · Wofford · 1-4	Kershaw · I · Bryan · 1-4	II · Paige · 2	6			

Scenario Key
Fredericksburg
Chancellorsville
Wilderness
Spotsylvania

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